Policy discussions in the United
Education and Training Markets
amples of such policies, indicated in the accompanying chart, in subsequent sections. Finally, in Section VI we analyze equilibrating mechanisms intended to bring demand and supply into equilibrium, an important though poorly appreciated feature of markets. The discussion covers a range of policy areas within education and job training, from early childhood programs through postsecondary education, since Britain has applied marketlike approaches to many different levels of education.
Supply Side Reforms
• Enhancing competition among institutions to undermine government monopoly (Section I) • Subcontracting mechanisms to enhance efficiency among suppliers (Section II) • Performance-based funding to mimic price incentives when competition is impossible (Section III)
Demand Side Reforms
• Improved access to information to enhance parental and student choice (Section IV) • Voucher mechanisms as a delivery mechanism to implement choices (Section V)
The policies we discuss establish quasi-markets or market-like incentives, rather than true markets, for one of three principle reasons: they affect only one of many non-market practices; they affect only demand or only supply; or they incorporate substantial government regulation, particularly through the National Curriculum that specifies virtually everything about the basic "commodity" and thereby eliminates many of the choices parents and students might want to make. As we examine each of these reforms in England, we will identify where the incompleteness of reforms has led to both opportunities and problems. While the efforts to establish market-like policies attempt to correct for the market failures of public institutions, in practice they are generated through a political process and inevitably apply patches of reform to a larger educational system. Because quasi-markets continue to violate the principles of pure markets, they may not be efficient, supply and demand may not adjust quickly to changing conditions, access to information may remain highly varied, and social costs are not passed along to consumers as they should be if externalities were correctly internalized. Indeed, when policy changes introduce some market-like elements but leave most institutional and political mechanisms in place, they may make matters worse. This illustrates a well-known proposition in economics embedded in the theory of second-best equilibria by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57) : if the conditions for perfect markets ("first-best" outcomes) are violated, then second-best outcomes may require departures from market conditions rather than mimicking what markets do.
In practice, the real power of the British reforms is that they have combined various market mechanisms. For example, the introduction of Finkelstein and Grubb institutional competition, by creating grant-maintained (GM) schools on the supply side, required a mechanism of informing parents on the demand side. As a result, information on test scores embodied in "League tables" was then required to provide limited information to parents about school performance. The real power of quasi-market mechanisms may emerge only when several policies are adopted and analyzed together.
Toward the end of the paper, we draw back from a discussion about institutional approaches to reform versus market-based approaches to ask whether this polarized form of debate is productive. A different question is to ask how we could combine the attractive features of markets with elements of institution-building. Indeed, some combination of public control with market-like arrangements may be the compromise toward which the current Blair government is moving, as it dismantles some of the least effective market-like mechanisms and reintroduces somewhat more institutional structure. Some vision of how to combine politics and marke~s might be valuable in the U.S. in guiding such an integration.
I. Introducing Institutional Competition and Variety
Market advocates have critiqued public schools for their near-monopoly over schooling and for becoming bloated, unresponsive to consumers, and ineffective. The solution has commonly been to enhance competition among schools--by allowing parents to choose schools within a district, by establishing charter schools (or schools-within-schools like Academies), or by creating voucher-like mechanisms permitting parents to choose among a range of public and private schools. In job training, several states (notably Florida) now allow public and private institutions to compete for contracts for remedial education and vocational skills training, and postsecondary education is an arena of relatively unbridled competition.
In England, the Thatcher government introduced competition among providers in a variety of ways, including local management of schools, the creation of grant-maintained schools, the creation of City Technology Colleges in secondary education, and changes in Further Education colleges in postsecondary education.
Local Management of Schools (LMS)
Local Management of Schools (LMS), implemented over six years as part of the 1988 Education Reform Act, has allowed headteachers (principals) with the consent of a governing board to manage the educational, fiscal, personnel, and site issues involved in running a school. At least in theory, LMS permitted schools to become differentiated through school-level budgetary and management discretion over countless issues. Today, most headteachers would not relinquish the authority that has been given to them under LMS. In practice, however, the discretion that headteachers have is quite marginal. About 80-90 percent of budgets are devolved to school sites, leaving LEAs (which are like our local districts) in control of only 10-20 percent. But salary scales are set nationally and, as in the U.S., dictate the vast majority of resource allocation.
Some schools look better than they have in years. They are clean, freshly painted, the furniture is often new, and the shrubs surrounding the playgrounds are trimmed. There have been savings in heating, repairs, food service, and equipment purchasing compared to earlier subcontracted arrangements through the LEAs (Levacic, 1995) . Further, schools have had to design an "image" portrayed in vast amounts of literature distributed to parents as a way of attracting pupils. The brochures are well-done, and visiting days are full of fanfare about the great offerings in each particular school. In most cases, however, the image is that of a traditional institution. While headteachers could in theory create visionary schools and then sink or swim against local competition, very little of this has occurred--partly because variation in instruction and curriculum is heavily restricted by the National Curriculum. While schools are free to compete for students, much of the competition involves attracting "good" students---often defined by their class and racial backgrounds and the absence of any special problems (language barriers, behavioral problems, or disabilities).
Whether students and parents have greater choices is a question of considerable debate. Only half of schools in England are operating at capacity (defined by physical space for students). 3 But while these figures seem to imply that finding space in a school of choice should be easy, they really illustrate the imbalance among schools: a large number of low-quality schools are under-enrolled, while a small number of popular schools are over-subscribed and elaborate appeals to find space for "one more child" have increased dramatically. According to the central government's Audit Commission, nearly 20 percent of parents did not get a place for their child at their first preference school. This, among other reasons, led the Commission to conclude that "the current approach to the supply and allocation of school places . . . is leaving a large number of schools with a significant mismatch between pupils and places; generating inefficient and educationally ineffective outcomes at some schools; and in some areas, offering limited diversity and choice, and resulting in low levels of satisfaction for a significant minority of parents" (Audit Commission, 1996, p. 23) .
Grant Maintained (GM) Schools
Another major supply-side reform of the Thatcher government was the design of Grant Maintained (GM) schools. 4 Schools were allowed to opt out of local government jurisdiction by petitioning the Funding Agency for Schools (FAS) with the support of parents and teachers. Because the Thatcher government wanted GM schools to succeed, their funding per pupil was typically 15 percent higher than funding for the remaining LEA schools, creating an incentive for local schools to opt out. (In contrast, charter schools in this country often complain that funding is lower than the average spending in their district so that financial problems dominate all educational concerns.) Once established, GM schools were supposed to accept a wide cross-section of students, and they had to adhere to the National Curriculum and test requirements, but they were free to him and fire their own teachers, attract students as best they could, and otherwise allocate resources without government interference.
The Thatcher government anticipated that thousands of schools would innovate under market conditions. But by 1997, only 1,020 of 25,000 Schools in England were Grant Maintained, and applications for GM status had nearly stopped. By all accounts, the GM experinaent was an energetic attempt to create greater diversity in schools that failed, even with extraordinary financial injections and significant latitude to innovate. New curricular forms, imaginative pedagogy, and innovative methods for grouping pupils am notably missing in researchers' accounts of GM schools. Instead, GM schools compete largely on the basis of fairly, traditional conceptions of educational quality (Edwards and Whitty, 1997; Fitz, Halpin, and Power, 1997) . Finally, we know. of no findings that support increased educational outcomes in GM schools.
The early grant-maintained schools established after 1988 were largely schools that "opted out" of LEA control, rather then new schools; in ka~aeri-can terms, they represented local control or site-based management, not an expansion of supply. In 1993 legislation, however, the Conservative government allowed groups of parents or other independent sponsors to establish GM schools; there has been considerable interest from religious groups including Muslims, Roman Catholics, Jews, and evangelical Christians, even though the sponsors must pay for 15 percent of the capital costs of such schools. Overall, only five such GM schools were approved between 1993 and 1996 out of perhaps 40 groups with interests in establishing such schools (Walford, 1997) . The central barrier has been the process of being approved by the Funding Agency for Schools, which has discouraged or turned down proposals that conflicted with LEA plans and where enrollments and funding seemed uncertain. One could argue, of course, that FAS is trying to assure that competition, is not destructive and that it results in stable schools rather than short-lived ventures. However, Walford (1997) has argued that FAS has taken a "franchising". approach, approving only schools that conform to a conventional type of school hewing closely to the National Curriculum and is not particularly interested in facilitating the religious and cultural diversity that applicants represent. Once more, the effect has been to narrow corn-.petition among institutions to conventional academic criteria.
In this competition, GM schools have an obvious advantage over LEA schools: they have smaller proportions of special education students, of low-achieving students, and of minority students (Afro-Caribbean males in particular). A student who Causes trouble can be expelled from a GM school, and these individuals are then likely to be accepted only by LEA schools. Therefore LEA schools complain that they are forced to include higher proportions of troublesome students, special education students, and immigrant students with English as a second language. The enrollment processes has produced precisely the inequities feared by opponents of markets: workingclass students, immigrants, minority students (save perhaps middle-class Asians), and special education students have faced more limited choices and are concentrated in lower-achieving schools. 5 Furthermore, the division between GM and LEA schools made the Thatcher attack on LEAs a self-fulfilling prophecy: in simple comparisons, LEA schools appear to be less effective, and schools cited as "failing" have most often been LEA schools.
City Technology Colleges
In addition to GM schools, the Thatcher government established a series of City Technology Colleges beginning in 1986. The CTCs were intended to be alternatives to academic secondary schools, oriented toward entrepreneurship and driven by computer-based technology--something like technology magnet high schools in the United States. Like GM schools, they were to be self-governing and free of LEA control.
However, contrary to government intention of creating a new type of secondary education, CTCs did not uniformly embrace new technology in distinctive ways, partly because they still had to follow the National Curriculum and be rated by conventional exams. Some attracted enrollments simply by appealing to traditional educational values; parents were more likely to see them as partially selective and more likely than neighborhood schools to uphold traditional values and discipline. And, as always in these marketqike innovations, mechanisms of selectivity crept in. The entrance procedure required a parental interview and evidence of commitment to education past age 16, to the CTC emphasis on science and technology, and to "qualities of enterprise, self-reliance, and responsibility"--a process that allowed some CTCs to practice selective admissions. Institutions that were initially justified by the innovation in education they would create thereby came to be more conventional academic schools with selection mechanisms. 6
Devolution of Control and Changing Professional Responsibilities
The devolution of control in English schools has forced powerful changes in the thinking of school heads (principals), who gained considerable authori W in the Thatcher years. There are, to be sure, examples of heads who have been able to think more carefully about the trade-offs in the various ways of achieving improved learning, and they are now better able to redirect resources from overhead to teaching (Clayton, 1994; Morris, 1994) . However, overall the competitive atmosphere has forced heads to concentrate on survival, enrollments, and fiscal management and has distanced them from teachers and teaching. To illustrate these new priorities, a report by the accounting firm of Coopers and Lybrand clarified that "it will be important to ensure that any.., consultation [with staff and students] does not unduly
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slow down decision-making, nor reduce management flexibility" (Gewirtz, Ball, & Bowe, 1995, p. 92) . Heads became more concerned with advertising, "poaching" students from good neighborhoods (or preventing their good students from being "poached" by other schools), and the influx of immigrants and working-class students than with the difficult task of how to teach low-performing students. It is evidently easier to gain a reputation and enrollments through advertising and manipulating the composition of a school than by improving the quality of teaching.
Despite some hopeful talk about heads becoming "bilingual"--conversant in both "technical rationality" (competition and fiscal managerialism) and "substantive rationality" (educational quality and equity)--the clear drift has been away from educational concerns] In the language describing American administrators developed by Cuban (1988) , competition has reinforced the managerial and political roles of heads over their educational roles. The irony is that competition, ostensibly a way to improve the quality of education, has driven schools and their heads away from a focus on teaching and learning.
Greater competition has also changed the language in which schools are discussed, in ways familiar from the history of American education (e.g., Callahan, 1962) : there has been much more talk of policies in terms of their fiscal consequences, of a school's image, of market awareness, and of practices (like textbook selection) that emphasize showiness over content. Among the most frightening effect is the tendency for schools to view students as commodities---as individuals who generate a certain revenue but who may cost a higher or lower amount. This careful calculation of marginal benefits and marginal costs 8 is most obviously detrimental to low-achieving students who require extra attention or smaller classes and to special education students, but its influence extends to high-achieving students as well: the benefit from luring middle class, high-achieving students is not that a school can help elevate them to greater sophistication but rather that they can pass their exams at lower cost. Students (or parents) are still the customers, but like all customers they are judged by what they contribute to "profit" (the surplus of marginal benefits over marginal costs), not by how they can benefit from the best efforts of teachers.
A final consequence is that competition has tended to isolate schools from each other. The individual school, rather than the system of schools, has been the focus of improvement efforts. Each school has been in competition with every other, so cooperation among them--for purposes of mutual improvement, for example, or for political alliance to advance their common cause--was more difficult. To be sure, GM schools began to organize "districts" (GM clusters) to provide economies of scale for such services as accounting, food service, and professional development, indicating how difficult it was to persist as isolated and independent schools. Nevertheless, the central impulse in competition has been an isolating one--quite the opposite of the system-building that has marked the history of education in the U.S. (Tyack, 1974) .
Education and Training Markets
Further Education Colleges (FE) Institutional transformations have also taken place in further education (FE) colleges, analogous to American community colleges. The Major government opened these institutions up to competition, principally by requiring them to incorporate as autonomous institutions free of LEA control--a form of site-based management with local control of finances and programs. Students were allowed to attend colleges outside their catchment areas, and various institutions (including sixthform colleges providing only grades 11 and 12, and specialized schools like agriculture schools) were allowed to provide similar courses, particularly GCSE and A-level programs. The result is the same kind of competition and the same managerial concerns as in GM schools. 9 The competition among institutions has driven down the costs of FE colleges. They are, as market advocates would celebrate, "leaner and fitter" than they were, and heads acknowledge some wasteful practices and under-enrolled programs have been eliminated. But cost reductions have also been achieved through the greater use of part-time instructors--as in community colleges in the U.S.--and have resulted in demoralized instructors. Like elementary-secondary schools, FE colleges have been forced to compete for students, though they tend to do so not particularly by improving the quality of teaching but instead by establishing more flexible schedules, by advertising in neighboring regions, by supporting college-run bus services to neighboring areas, and by attracting more middle-class students trying to pass A-level exams rather than by low-status occupational courses--much as American community colleges try to increase transfer rates as the most visible sign of effectiveness. One head noted the competitive advantage a gleaming new building gave the college over its competitors, and predictably enough brochures featured happy-looking students conversing in some of its most photogenic corners. She described competition among institutions in her region as "open, fierce, and unbridled"; the Times Educational Supplement called competition in the southwest of England a "wild west battle for students". Some of these changes--studentresponsive scheduling, for example--are precisely what markets are supposed to create, but advocates for competition usually cite improvements in teaching and learning rather than bus schedules when they extol the virtues of competition.
As is true for heads in GM schools, the heads of FE colleges have been pressured by competition to shift their focus, away from educational and "pastoral" concerns and toward enrollment and fiscal issues. A number have apparently left their positions, uncomfortable with the strain of becoming "bilingual". Over time this process will squeeze out individuals with educational interests and force boards to scrutinize their applicants for business savvy and competitive instincts rather than educational concerns. Again, the parallels in the U.S. are obvious, where community colleges are enrollmentdriven and are in competition for students. Most administrators are oriented to fiscal concerns first and foremost, frequently accused by their faculty of being uninterested in teaching (Grubb and Associates, 1999, chap. 8) .
The efforts to introduce competition in England have certainly had some positive effects, but the variety of schools has remained largely unchanged, partly because of the constraints of the National Curriculum. The changes have largely reinforced a conventional image of schooling and the continued domination of the "one best system" (Tyack, 1974) . There is no sign of improved outcomes, and the obvious inequities by class, race, and disability have become worse. Overall, the basis of competition has become the physical plant, the family background of students, convenience, and bus schedules rather than the quality and variety of instruction.
II. Subcontracting as a Route to Efficiency
Another market-like mechanism on the supply side is subcontracting, where a government accepts bids from various public and private providers for specific services and chooses among them, presumably on the basis of price and quality. Subcontracting is one mechanism for increasing competition, where a government (rather than parents or students) makes the choice among providers. It is widely viewed as a way of reducing costs or providing specialized services. In the U.S., competitive subcontracting has been widely used to provide social services like child care; job training programs have often used subcontracting to choose among various providers, and several states now require competitive subcontracting for parts of their workforce development systems. The most controversial practice has involved the practice of subcontracting with private providers to run entire schools, as Baltimore did with Education Alternatives Inc. in a notable failure. Many local governments subcontract a range of services from garbage collection to bill collection, with persistent controversy over whether privatized services are provided at lower cost (or reduced cost plus higher quality) rather than costing more (with lower quality) because of contracting costs (Sclar, 1998) .
In England, as part of the search for greater efficiency, Conservative governments encouraged LEAs to subcontract for many of the services they used to provide directly, particularly staff development. Individual schools were given budgets and allowed to contract for their own staff development. LEAs could bid for such contracts, but they would face competition from other LEAs and from private providers (including former LEA employees who formed their own firms). While this should maximize the satisfaction of the "consumer"--the school--in practice two problems have arisen. The most obvious is that it has become nearly impossible to put together sustained staff development integrated with the activities of the school. Instead contracts are typically written for one-shot events--the familiar pattern of staff development through Friday afternoon workshops--provided by outsiders unfamiliar with the school. Teachers and heads, and providers of staff development, have all complained about the disjointed nature of services provided under subcontracted arrangements. This competitive mechanism is difficult to use when the services are abstract and their coordination with other activities is critical.
A second and more subtle problem with subcontracting is that, once again, it emphasizes each school as the basic unit of education, not a system of schools. The role that LEAs played in England before Thatcherism--using their broad familiarity with practice to provide technical assistance to weaker schools--was effectively destroyed by subcontracting. Now, weak schools are much more on their own in trying to improve their performance. But, just as uninformecl consumers in choice mechanisms are unlikely to make rational decisions, weak schools may not know what they need to improve and therefore cannot subcontract for appropriate staff development.
Another form of subcontracting has been developed for school inspections. Inspection is a process, extending back to the mid-19th century, of examining the quality of schools using external inspectors. 1° Before 1993, a corps of Her (or His) Majesty's Inspectors (HMIs) carried out inspections. Schools often developed long-term relationships with HMIs, who could return and provide advice about specific instructional problems.
In 1993, however, the scale of inspections was increased and a contracting mechanism replaced the permanent staff of HMIs. Teams of inspectors bid on contracts to inspect a group of schools, and contracts can be awarded on the basis of both expertise and cost. In practice, however, it is difficult to judge the quality of inspection teams, and most educators (and most inspectors themselves, in our limited sample) believe that cost is the determining factor. Inspections are highly pressured events, with little time for consultation with individual teachers about their performance; as one school head noted, "it's necessarily a cut-rate production". The possibilities for continuous relationships with inspectors have been destroyed because no one is paid for continuing consultation and advice. As a result, the expertise that inspectors have developed cannot be made available to teachers and schools because the subcontracting mechanisms do not allow it. Thus subcontracting has systematically destroyed the availability of expertise about teaching to teachers and heads because of its fragmentation and pressure on costs and time. H Again, where continuity is important and certain tasks (like consultation) cannot be precisely budgeted, subcontracting is a poor mechanism for providing services.
In England, where subcontracting has become pervasive, it then seems natural to propose subcontracting in new ways. For example, the head of Education Sector Development for the Office of Public Management proposed that universities and colleges be converted into contracting mechanisms: "Universities and colleges would be reduced essentially to their senior managers and administrative support and reconfigured to have, as their primary role, the commissioning of courses and programmes" (Albury, 1996) . Aside from the obvious problems in writing so many contracts, monitoring their terms, and assuring the quality of individual courses, this proposal presumes that a college or university is merely a collection of independent courses or programs, with the interactions among them, the role of student life outside the classroom, the interplay between teaching and research of no consequence. However, no one believes that an education at Oxford or Cambridge is merely a contract to take courses, though the new universities (former polytechnics) and FE colleges might fit this model, just as community colleges and non-selective four-year colleges in the U.S. are often commuter institutions without much institutional life. A view of educational institutions as subcontracting mechanisms destroys all hope for a richer vision of these colleges and betrays everything that Americans think of as a college.
The proponents of subcontracting have often failed to recognize a basic understanding of economic institutions developed over sixty years ago. In the early 1930s, Berle and Means (1933) asked why large firms existed--why, in effect, firms did not consist simply of a small core of managers subcontracting for specific services like production, marketing, accounting, and the like (like Albury's vision of a university). Their answer, now widely accepted by the profession, is that the transactions costs of such a firm would be too high, namely, the costs of writing so many contracts, of monitoring their performance, of assuring the appropriate coordination between production and distribution, between marketing and sales, and between research and production. So too, a recent review of privatization in the U.S. in such areas as vehicle and highway maintenance concluded that privatization costs an additional 20 percent or so because of the higher costs of contracting, evaluating performance, and monitoring compliance (Sclar, 1997 (Sclar, , 1998 . Levin and Driver (1997) have estimated that a national system of vouchers might increase educational costs by up to 27 percent, though this results largely front the costs of including additional students and from transportation, not particularly from evaluation and monitoring costs. When the service is vehicle maintenance, the costs take obvious monetary foma. When the service is education, the costs are likely to take the less obvious forms of incoherent institutions, inconsistent practices, and lower quality.
III. Performance-Based Funding (PBF)
The British examples we have explored so far harness competition among suppliers to enhance choice or quality or to reduce costs. In some cases, however, it is difficult to create even quasi-markets, and so governments may mimic the action of markets through performance-based funding (PBF). By providing different levels of funding by levels of performance or quality, PBF mimics the actions of markets that establish higher prices t:or higherquality goods and services and thereby generates incentives for programs to improve quality. In the U.S., merit pay for teachers (a particular type of PBF) has been extensively discussed though rarely adopted. Tennessee has allocated 5 percent of its funding for vocational education under PBF, Florida has just instituted PBF for 15 percent of its funding to community colleges and vocational training centers, and other states are contemplating PBF. Systems of PBF require two distinct elements: the measurement of perfor-mance, which is usually controversial and consumes the most attention, and the mechanism by which funding is assigned to different levels of performance. If the differentials between high and low levels of performance are too small, then providers may not respond as intended. If the differentials are too large, the incentives for misrepresentation may become too great. Another problem is deciding who should be rewarded. If individuals are rewarded in a collective enterprise, like a school, then PBF may destroy the incentives to collaborate and generate resentment rather than cooperation.
In England, the process of incorporating FE colleges also introduced a version of PBF. Rather than distributing funds simply on the basis of enrollments--a process which rewards "bums on seats" rather than educational progress or learning--the new funding mechanism provides funding for students enrolled in November, February, and May, rewarding retention in addition to enrollment. This aspect of PBF has caused colleges to be more concerned with the process of induction (counseling students upon enrollment), student planning, and tutoring support (Spouts & Lucas, 1996) , all of which are unambiguously good. On the other hand, some colleges have achieved higher completion by reducing time in courses and by putting students in lower-level courses where they are more likely to complete.
In addition, the funding mechanism provides additional resources for students with special needs for child care, avoiding the problems where competition leads schools to try to exclude such "expensive" students. Less positively, the funding mechanism provides greater resources for courses that meet national targets, including numbers receiving National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs). Such incentives are consistent with overall Government policy but--given the controversy surrounding these qualifications (described in Section Vl)--are not necessarily consistent with local autonomy, effective competition, or good practice. Moreover, the process of implementing PBF involves a succession of new complexities; for example, FE colleges have complained that the funding mechanisms fail to provide adequately for part-time students and for student backgrounds. PBF in FE colleges has avoided some difficult measurement problems (like quantifying learning) and some problems of "creaming", but the mixed effects illustrate that PBF is difficult to perfect.
Performance-based funding has also been instituted for research funds in universities. In the first stage, tables ranked all departments within universities on a 5-point scale based on the proportion of faculty denoted as research faculty and on the amount of research they perform. (A college can therefore decide whether to denote a large fraction of faculty with a low average level of publication or a small proportion with a higher average level.) Research funds are then allocated on the basis of these rankings, providing incentives for institutions to enhance research, either through the breadth or the intensity of research among their faculty.
Of course, universities can enhance research by providing resources, release time from teaching, colleagues, and collegial support, or they can lure research talent from other institutions. In practice, universities have
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followed the latter route, luring away prolific researchers with high salaries or creating fellowships for young researchers. The resulting demand has increased the salaries of research-oriented individuals, indirectly introducing a form of merit pay. But, aside from unknown economies of agglomeration, this game of mt, sical chairs is largely zero-sum, with much less thought given to increasing the overall amount or quality of research. The competition for researchers has been highly divisive: researchers count in ways that nonresearchers do not, exacerbating the familiar division between research and teaching. Tim rankings among universities has been "settled" with much hue and cry from the disappointed, and departments within a university can turn on their lower-ranked peers. There is, of course, a long debate over the value of competition in spurring research, and science is often viewed as benefiting from competition, but the norms of collegiality that undergird certain conceptions of educational institutions have been weakened by this form of PBF.
The English experience with performance-based research funding clarifies the different routes that institutions (or individuals) can take to enhance their performance--in the research case, by poaching in the short run rather than developing research over the long run, and in FE colleges by shortening courses or easing standards. As Adam Smith (1776, chap. 10, part 2) noted two centuries ago, there is more than one way to increase profits in markets--or resources under performance-based funding: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."
IV. Voucher Mechanisms: Elite Education, Job Training, and
Child Care Vouchers are another mechanism for facilitating consumer choice, though they enable a specified set of consumers to be funded (rather than all individuals). They can also be used to restrict purchases to an approved list of commodities or schools--just as food stamps can be used for groceries but not liquor, and Pell grants can be used only in accredited institutions. In the U.S., vouchers are already used for child care in some states, for postsecondary education through various grants and the recent Hope and Lifelong Learning tax credits, and for training in the Individual Training Accounts to be established by the Workforce Investment Act of 1998. England instituted vouchers in several ways, particularly in the Assisted Places Scheme, in Training Credits, and in vouchers for child care.
The Assisted Places Scheme
The Assisted Places Scheme provided the equivalent of vouchers for lowincome students ("able children from less well-off homes") to attend elite private schools. Students were selected by income level and by an interview process. The schools eligible to enroll such students were identified on the Education and 7"raining Markets basis of traditional academic criteria (high pass rates in examinations, high rates of university entrance, and a wide choice of conventional academic subjects). The Assisted Places Scheme was quite limited, enrolling about 10,000 students by 1996; therefore it was a way of providing a few students greater opportunities but was not a significant mechanism of reshaping education. The Scheme was almost precisely like the proposals that would allow lowqncome students in the U.S. to receive vouchers to attend private schools, particularly in cities. Like those proposals, the Scheme represented a way to escape urban schools that were seen as failing and impossible to reform.
While the Scheme was viewed as a way to help "poor but able" students, from limited educational and cultural backgrounds, in practice the students selected into the program were largely from "submerged middleclass backgrounds already well-endowed with cultural capital", and not the working-class children the Scheme envisioned) 2 This pattern reveals the powerful effects of creaming in such market-like mechanisms, operating both on the part of consumers and on the part of the institutions involved. No doubt the Scheme improved somewhat the quality of education available to a select few; for example, Tooley (1997) argues that British choice mechanisms have allowed some working-class parents--the active choosers--to promote their children out of the working class. Overall, however, the Scheme did not help many students from inner-city schools.
Youth Training Credits
Training Credits were introduced in tile early 1990s to provide unemployed high school drop-outs with greater control over the job training they received in contrast to the conventional case (in the U.S. as in England) where trainees have restricted options to choose from. The Credits took the physical form of a plastic "smart card" allowing individuals to spend about £1,500 (around $2,500, not far from what JTPA spends per person). Training was to be selected jointly with an employer so that both employers and trainees could choose the source of training, satisfying both the ultimate consumer, the employer, and the intermediate consumer, the trainee. 13 In practice, however, both sources of clemand behaved "irrationally" (Hodkinson, Sparkes, & Hodkinson, 1996; MacDonald & Coffield, 1993) . In place of the "technical rationality" assumed by the Training Credits program, the trainees displayed what researchers called "pragmatic" rationaliW, in that they were limited by their experiences, constrained by tile opportunities in the local labor market most familiar to them, and affected by others (particularly employers) choosing for them. For their part, employers tended to work with training providers they knew rather than shopping around for the most appropriate provider. The result is that this voucher system and the market it created did not expand the options open to young people.
Tile Training Credits illustrate at least two other problems with voucher mechanisms. Most public programs assume that, as long as consumers are
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well-informed about alternatives, they will make rational and self-interested decisions themselves; thus the Training Credits provided information through the National Careers Service (though in practice career teachers were marginal players). However, from another perspective the ability to make decisions is itself a competence that must be developed rather than assumed. It requires, inter alia, well-developed preferences that many young people do not have, an ability to weigh current and future consequences, an ability to understand and decide rationally about probabilistic events, and knowledge of available options. In truly developmental programs for young people--or for the "passive choosers" who are of so much concern in U.S. discussions--decision-making would be a competence to be taught along with other cognitive and vocational skills. From this perspective the provision of information may be necessary, but it is not sufficient to enable consumers to choose on their own behalf.14 Second, the Training Credits illustrate a particular kind of equilibrium typical in education and training markets. In this case, relatively unprepared youth--with low levels of formal schooling, little labor market experience, and little sophistication~were hired by small and marginal employers who viewed trainees as a cheap source of labor but did not see the program as a source of skilled labor for the long run. This is a "low quality equilibrium", in which there is a match between low-skilled workers and low-wage, lowproductivity employers. Elsewhere in the labor market a "high quality equilibrium" exists, matching well-educated individuals (e.g., from Oxbridge and the older "red-brick" universities) with high-wage employers with prospects for continuous training and advancement. It is difficult to create a market with high-quality opportunities for relatively uneducated trainees, since high-quality employers will not participate. In conventional terms, the market operates, but it does so in ways that create segmented labor markets and mediocre opportunities for marginal youth.
Child Care Vouchers
At the other end of the education system, vouchers for child care were createcl beginning in September 1996 and were distributed to parents of all four year olds. Providers had to meet minimum licensing requirements. They then redeemed the vouchers from LEAs, who were required to convert their existing child care programs into voucher-eligible programs. Despite overwhelming evidence from implementation trials in four shires (counties) that there was insufficient information for both parents and providers, as well as inadequate funding, the program went ahead nationally.
From the outset, it was well known that the government had no intention of increasing funding for child care. As a result, the uniform entitlement required a fixed pool of funding to include people who had not previously required any government subsidy. The obvious consequence was that vouchers were inadequate; a rough estimate is that they covered 70 percent of the cost of care in group settings. In some cases LEAs made up the difference out of discretionary funding to allow programs of higher quality and cost to continue. But in other cases, group sizes were adjusted upward and less qualified care-givers were hired to reduce costs. 15 This illustrates the political tendency to undermine the value of vouchers, resulting in lowerquality services than those available to parents who can afford such services on their own.
Prior to the distribution of vouchers, parents relied to a great extent on LEAs to provide and/or monitor child care arrangements. LEAs made judgments to finance child care arrangements that were dependent on particular needs within communities, in some cases making allocations for child care a priority over other educational services. But the voucher experiment eliminated the LEA's role and judgment and reduced funding and quality as well. These difficulties with the child care voucher convinced the Labour government to cancel the program on the first day the new government held office in May 1997.
Overall, experiences with vouchers in England illustrate the familiar argument from the U.S. A demand-side market mechanism presupposes that consumers have adequate information, sufficient sophistication in decisionmaking, and adequate funding. But in practice the prerequisites are difficult to achieve, and inequities creep in. The result has all too often been to lower quality and increase inequality, without expanding choices for the majority of consumers.
V. Parent and Student Choice: Information Mechanisms
A well-known corollary of competition on the supply side is that consumers on the demand side must be well-informed. As a result, the American debate over choice mechanisms has worried whether parents (or students themselves) could have adequate information on which to base choices and whether some might be passive rather active choosers. As examples of information mechanisms, New York City has an information "booklet" the size of a small telephone directory to help eighth graders and their parents make choices among its many high schools; there is an active market in information about four-year colleges, with a bewildering array of guides and rating services. The U.S. Department of Labor has established One-Stop Centers to provide information about local education and training programs to prospective clients.
In England, the problem of consumer information has been addressed through the creation of League tables. These annual tables, published separately for different levels, contain infonnation on rates of passing standard exams for every school in the country. While the Department for Education and Employment provides several measures of effectiveness, the press usually ranks schools within a shire on the basis of a single test, so there can be no mistake about where a school ranks. For example, even though the League tables for secondary schools provide several different indicators of Finkelstein and Grubb quality, they are ranked according to the proportion passing GCSE exams--that is, receiving at least a C on 5 exams. Table 1 presents a section of the League tables for 1996 published in the Times.
League tables have made an enormous difference to the ways schools operate. School administrators and teachers are preoccupied with their rank° ings in the League table. The measures used--passing rates on national exams--shape the goals of virtually all schools, and only an elite school with a secure reputation or a determinedly idiosyncratic school can afford to ignore the League tables. Furthermore, the precise way in which information is reported may determine the strategy of individual schools. As a head of a secondary school revealed to one of us unabashedly, when the measure of success is the proportion of students passing GCSE exams, a school's rational strategy is a triage approach. The high-achieving students who are likely to pass are assigned good teachers to keep them on course, but without extraordinary attention; the low-achieving students who have little chance of passing without extraordinary (and expensive) measures are "kept warm and dry", assigned mediocre or tired-out teachers; and the students in the middle, the ones who have a good chance of passing with the school's assistance, are assigned the best teachers and the most services. If League tables conveyed different information--the average GCSE exam score, for example, or the scores of the top and bottom 25 percent of students--then the incentives for schools woulcl be different. Thus particular strategies have emerged in response to the combination of institutional competition and the specific information available to parents--the interaction of supply-and demand-side polices.
The League tables suffer from some important limitations. In addition to serious technical problems with the construction of GCSE and A-level exams themselves, 16 the League tables rank schools according to a single, conventional, academic measure describing performance in the short run. There is no information about innovations, the breadth or specialization of offerings, or accommodations for special needs. Second, the League tables present levels of achievement, not improvements that might be due to a particular school. There are no corrections for the family background of students or the achievement levels of students entering schools. While the top-and bottomranked schools are usually recognizable as being elite schools and "estate" schools (located near public housing), respectively, in the broad middle of the distribution it is difficult to disentangle school quality from the effects of family background unless one assumes that parents can do econometrics in their heads. Indeed, an examination of parental choice in Scotland showed that parents could not readily distinguish among schools with similar class backgrounds but different levels of effectiveness (Willms and Echols, 1992) . Except at the extremes, therefore, the information in the League tables is difficult to use to identify schools that might improve the achievement of one's child.
In addition to the failure of League tables as information, British researchers have been able to explore more subtle issues related to making :'Schools in each at, thority :ire ranked according to tile percentage of those aged 15 :it the sta,'t of each year achieving five or more A-C GCSE passes. "File A-level average point score uses the university entrance system (A = 10, B = 8, C = 6, D = 4, E = 2). 1'"Truancy" figures represent the percentage of half-days missed through unauthorized absences. Wypes of school: C, local authority; VA, voluntary aided; VC, voluntary controlled; GM, grantmaintained; SA, special agreement; CTC, city technology college; Ind, independent; Comp, comprehensive; Mod, secondary modern; Sel, selective; Nonsel, non-selective.
choices. Reay and Ball (1997) have argued that the apparent divisions between middle-class, "active" consumers and working-class, "passive" consumers---or "alert" and "inert" choosers (Willms and Echols, 1992)--are not a matter of information or of laziness or caring. Rather, many working-class parents almost by definition have experienced personal failure in school, and so investing in careful thought about which school might be better for their children requires them first to accept that a school might benefit their children, an assumption contradicted by their own experiences. Second, they also must accept that the multiple schools among which they might choose in their area are appropriate for their children rather than dismissing predominantly middle-class schools as places where their children would not fit in. The objects of choice are not, as they are considered in economic theory, institutions valued only for their attributes (quality of teaching, breadth of offerings, and the like). Rather, they are objects of fear and confusion. The process of rational choice requires consideration of certain alternatives and counter-factual situations that the experiences of workingclass parents preclude them from considering, so their decisions seem irrational, limited, and passive. This argument recognizes that information is only part of the decision-making process and that the ability to make decisions in "rational" ways is a competence that is developed only over time with appropriate experiences. In addition to informing consumers, the League tables are also used by the central government (along with information from inspections) to identify failing schools in need of special intervention. Some of these schools are no doubt wretched places in serious need of reform. But the 33 schools identified as failing between 1993 and 1996 were concentrated in poor neighborhoods with high proportions of immigrant, low-income, and minority students (Tomlinson, 1997) . This use of League tables is reminiscent of the recent practice of urban school districts and states in the U.S. of identifying failing schools through test scores--through levels rather than changes in test scores--and then reconstituting them, a process that may bring more turmoil than improvement.
Proponents of market-like mechanisms might see in these results only temporary problems, ones that can be overcome as both information and consumers become more sophisticated. In fact, the Department for Education and Employment proposed achievement measures adjusted for prior attainment and completed significant analytic work but then abandoned these efforts as technically infeasible given the amount of mobility among students and as too complex for parents to understand. 17 And that is precisely the point: a simple numerical measure of "quality" understandable by most parents and students will inevitably misstate the nature of education. The more complex methods that reflect an institution more accurately--standardized or value-added measures, indicators of multiple dimensions of quality--are not so readily understood and take us back to problems with active and passive choosers. The underlying problem is that the "commodity" itself cannot be simply defined.
VI. Equilibrating Mechanisms: NVQs and GNVQs
The market-like mechanisms we have discussed so far operate either on the supply side, to increase competition among providers (or, in the case of PBF, to mimic price incentives), or on the demand side, to facilitate informed choice among consumers. However, a little-recognized requirement in markets is that the equilibrium between demand and supply is only a potential equilibrium. This equilibrium must emerge through a process of marketmaking, creating a place, or forum, or mechanism where potential demanders and potential suppliers can meet. In advanced economies, marketmaking absorbs enormous resources: wholesale and retail trade, almost the entire financial services sector, and the real estate sector all represent costs of market-making. Indeed, the costs of organizing markets may prevent them from coming into being, as is true for private schools and child care; it may be necessary to intervene to create a market where potential demand and supply exist, but where a market and therefore an equilibrium between demand and supply does not emerge.
In England (as in the U.S.), one of the greatest concerns has been the under-supply of skilled labor, and a series of White Papers has called for increases in "key" or "core skills". The problem is presumably not that demand for high-skilled work exists--the declarations by employers are testimony to their need for skilled workers--nor the absence of institutions to provide higher levels of skills. Rather, employers cannot signal their demand to the education market clearly enough, particularly since a "qualifications jungle" has grown up with thousands of different credentials difficult for any participant to understand.
One resolution was the creation by the Thatcher Government of National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs), which articulated six core skills, namely, in communications, problem-solving, application of number, information technology, working with others, and improving one's own performance, and then created a series of occupation-specific assessments to test these core skills (Green, 1996) . In theory, the NVQs are equilibrating mechanisms. Employers would require them for hiring, education providers would prepare their students to pass such assessments, and students would understand the necessity for acquiring these competencies. All participants in the market for skills would behave in unison, coordinated by the signal of the appropriate NVQs, just as participants in conventional markets are coordinated by prices.
In practice, the acceptance of NVQs has not turned out as planned. The Government declared that its conception of skill measurement--one based on task analysis and competency-based assessment--would be used in developing NVQs and required employer groups to accept this conception. But this process substituted the government's conception of demand for that of employers, and many firms found the NVQs unacceptable. In the engineering sector, for example, the NVQs were pitched at too low a level and demanded an overly specific set of skills; in addition, many employers saw no need to t;inkelstein and Grubb abandon qualifications that had worked well for them. The result is that NVQs were not generally used by employers in the most advanced sectors where high skills are presumably the most crucial (Senker, 1996) . (They have, if anything, introduced a new disequilibrium into the markets for skilled labor because they have often determined the content of educational programs without changing employer demand.) NVQs have been used as intended largely in service sectors---like hospitality and tourism--where no credentials had previously existed, and where the foundations of the NVQs are presumably less objectionable (Robinson, 1996) .
The contrast with General National Vocational Qualifications is instructive. GNVQs, as their name implies, were developed to bridge the "pari W of esteem" between vocational (or professional) and academic subjects. Like NVQs, in conception they were methods of coordinating demand by employers with supply from educational providers. But in the case of GNVQs, demand came to be assured in a way unforeseen by their creators: many new universities have accepted GNVQs for admissions in place of A-level exams. Thus GNVQs have become relatively popular among students, but demand has come from within the educational system itself, not from employers. A skeptic might say that GNVQs have, if anything, debased standards because the tests of core skills include low-level skills. What began as a mechanism to enhance content has had the opposite effect.
One moral of these reforms is the difficulty of certifying competencies in education and training, and the special pitfalls of govemnaent substituting its conception of demand for that of employers. If interventions into markets fail to get the nature of demand right, they cannot possibly work as intended.
VII. Institutional Reform and Market Mechanisms: Reconciling the Alternatives
Over the past few decades, the one widely accepted inlprovement in British education has been the expansion of access to postsecondat T education, through the conversion of fomler polytechnics into universities and through the expansion of FE colleges. But greater access has not relied on any market-like mechanism, nor has it been accompanied by any obvious increase in the quali W of education. As in the U.S., it is easier to expand the quantity rather than the quali W of education. Overall, it is hard to see much advantage from the long experiments with market-like mechanisms in England. The improvements have been small, often cosmetic, and limited to a few well-placed and active choosers. There is no evidence that overall learning has improved. The variety of schools and colleges has not expanded appreciably, even in those reforms (like the City Technology Colleges and Grant-Maintain schools) where that was the intent. The challenges of creating active consumers have not been met on any large scale, and in many ways the dominant approach to information (League tables) represents a step backward because it emphasizes short-run and narrowly measured effects. The fragmentation of institutions--the isolation of GM schools and FE colleges, the downsizing of LEAs, the weakening of staff development under contracting mechanisms, the demise of HMI--has its own negative effects. Heads of schools have turned their attention more toward enrollment, marketing, and business concerns and away from educational matters, quite the opposite of improving the commitment to teaching and learning. The conversion of students into commodities (as in Grant-Maintained schools and FE colleges) is not a result to celebrate. Of course, some of these results are due to the fact that quasimarkets cannot achieve the efficiency and effectiveness claimed for true markets: the continued restrictions of the National Curriculum, the inadequate funding of child care vouchers, and the incomplete approach to creating active choosers in virtually all these policies reflect the reality that full-blown markets are unlikely to be created through democratic policies operating on the margins of large public systems.
In addition, the English experience confirms that proponents of equity have everything to fear from these kinds of market-like mechanisms. Mechanisms of selection have expanded everywhere, often in subtle ways. This is a public as well as a private issue: England, like the U.S., suffers in international comparisons not because of the quality of its elite schools but because of the failures of its worst schools, usually urban and serving lower-class and minority students. But there has been little positive effect of these marketlike mechanisms for the urban poor. The beneficiaries in choice mechanisms are the parents who are able to put their children in slightly more selective schools, the children of poor but educated parents who enrolled in elite schools through the Assisted Places Scheme, and the students in FE colleges with more flexible schedules. It is hard to imagine that these benefits justify the turmoil that market-oriented changes have caused.
Currently in the U.S., various distinct approaches to school reform coexist. One set of reformers have emphasized market-like mechanisms including vouchers, choice mechanisms, charter schools, market-like incentives like PBF, and other approaches similar to recent British policies. With the ascendance world-wide of market mechanisms, the demise of welfare states and of socialist economies based on non-market principles, we expect these market pressures on education to grow, as part of the long transformation of pre-capitalist institutions by market values and norms, ts At the same time, various institutional and whole-school reforms have proliferated in the U.S., like Accelerated Schools, those based on the principles of the Coalition of Essential Schools, Comer schools, schools adopting career clusters, career Academies, and other elements of "education through occupations".
The institutional mechanisms of reforming public schools directly and the market-like mechanisms of reforming schools through choice and corn-• petition are distinctly different approaches to reform. But an obvious question is whether this way of framing reform options--of institutional mechanisms or market mechanisms--is the right way to frame education and training policy. Earlier in this century, John Dewey counseled that educators
Finkelstein and Grubb
ought to avoid false and counterproductive dichotomies--for example, the distinctions between play and work, the abstract and the applied, the academic and the vocational. At the beginning of Experience and Education (1938) , he decried the tendency of educators to think in "either-ors" and went on to argue that the problem was not one of replacing one widely accepted alternative with another. "The problem is not even recognized, to say nothing of being solved, when it is assumed that it suffices to reject the ideas and practices of the old education and then go to the opposite extreme" (p. 22). Instead, Dewey suggested new approaches to education from a reconciliation of dichotomies.
This Deweyan approach suggests that, rather than continue to argue about market-like mechanisms in either-or terms, we should ask how the best features of markets can be combined with the best aspects of institutional reforms. After all, as Chubb and Moe (1990) argue perstiasively, many aspects of markets are valued by Americans, including choice, flexibility, and efficiency, at the same time that their perverse effects and inequities are widely feared.
One way to combine institutional supports with market mechanisms is to introduce market mechanisms with more careful understanding of their undesirable consequences. Recently Britain seems to be taking this approach, and as part of its strategy the Labour Government has moderated some of the market mechanisms put into place by its predecessors. For example, GM schools were placed back under LEA control and renamed foundation schools, recognizing that the GM experiment was unsuccessful at expanding innovations and improving learning. The Assisted Places scheme was similarly dismantled, recognizing the limitations of the program in expanding choice. Child Care vouchers were rescinded after only eight months, recognizing public outcry against the system that had been proposed. In the case of GM schools, the government found itself playing a more active role because it is difficult to close a school under market conditions. By 1994 the Funding Agency for Schools (FAS) found itself monitoring schools closely, trying to assist schools identified as failing and demonstrating a commitment to students receiving inadequate educational services; in such cases, FAS looked much like an LEA that covered a large geographic area.
Other policy changes under Labour are not as straightforward because of a policy dilemma. On the one hand, England has spent 17 years developing an understanding of what it means to compete. On the other hand, this indoctrination has not paid off" in clear and measurable improvements, in countless areas of government---certainly education, but also health care, transportation, and the public utility markets (Finkelstein, 2000) . The Labour strategy has been to support market-based activity but at the same time to invest in some institutional support, apparently realizing what education researchers have said for a long time--there are no quick fixes to improving educational outcomes, and that organizational change coupled with flexibility, innovations in pedagogy, and highly qualified teachers is required to reach students with many different needs. Under Blair the role of the LEA has been strengthened once again, a new role in supporting school plans for improvement and helping headteachers develop strategic plans. League tables will improve, Labour has promised to continue to educate the public about education and the choices available to them (although the technical difficulties still seem unresolvable). The vision is less about some schools sinking while others swim. It is much more about helping every school swim well--a collective and systemic rather than an individual vision.
Our understanding is that strong LEAs will be supported by governmental structures to innovate and to implement policy as they see appropriate. Incentives are being offered to LEAs to try new strategies to reach students, particularly in areas of pover W through Education Action Zones. In these primarily urban zones, schools have new latitude to innovate, including setting aside the National Curriculum. Other programs are being developed to allow LEAs to offer support for teachers, stable professional networks, and feedback mechanisms from testing results to guide future curricular development. LEAs and the research communi W have been asked to provide assistance in reviewing the National Curriculum as well. Literacy centers have been opened across the country to provide institutional centers for improved reading and writing instruction as well as tutorial services for inner-city children. As a way to improve the quality of education more generally, the Blair government has announced a series of strategies targeted toward improving teacher capacity. However, weak LEAs unable to capitalize on the oppolxunities available to them will not be tolerated. In those cases, central government appears to be willing to place strong regulatory structures in place to lead from the center those LEAs that cannot improve locally.
Thus England seems to be moving toward a blend of market-based strategies and institutional supports through stronger LEAs. Remnants of the Conservative approach via market-based mechanisms prevail in the ongoing policy of LMS, school choice, and a commitment to low-cost services being provided by an elaborate network of contractors. At the same time, government control is stronger. The National Curriculum and corresponding assessment mechanisms are still the cornerstones of the standard. In addition, the Labour government has affirmed some more institutional support for schools and particularly local government. The recent English experience suggests one way to think about combining institutional reforms and market mechanisms, and we in the U.S. should continue to watch the British system as we debate market-based strategies.
A second and somewhat different way to combine institutional reforms and market mechanisms is to note, from both the British evidence and the American experience, that markets sometimes work well and sometimes work badly, and institutional and policy intervention may be necessary to shift from "weak" to "strong" markets. In general, markets work best when sophisticated consumers face what we might call "strong" providers--those that are relatively stable, sure of their purposes, technically competent, and committed as much to the product they provide as to profit. Where consumers are uninformed or unsure of themselves, they are unlikely to be able to act rationally on their own behalf (as was clear for youth receiving Training Credits, or "experimenters" entering our community colleges). When unsophisticated consumers face suppliers who are "weak" for example, new entrants or providers committed more to profit than their product, sometimes ruthless and exploitive--then fraud and low quality may result, as happens with many proprietary schools in the U.S. Alternatively, in the case of "weak" suppliers, the struggle for existence may simply consume them, as happens with many small businesses struggling to survive and with many charter schools trying to get off the ground. And finally, when suppliers do not have a strong sense of their purpose--in the case of schools, of their educational purposes--then it is all too easy to see market logic replace educational and pedagogical issues, as in grant-maintained schools.
When consumers are sophisticated and understand precisely what they want, and stable suppliers have a clear sense of purpose and are technically competent, then there is less reason to fear that markets will result in instability, inequity, fraud, or poor quality. The greater effectiveness of markets with sophisticated consumers and "strong" institutions helps explain why we have fewer qualms about the "markets" in elite higher education where these conditions prevail. However, as we move away from elite universities and the children of well-educated parents to community colleges and lessinformed individuals without clear preferences, .9 to welfare recipients in search of training facing proprietary schools, then the results of these market-like mechanisms are increasingly unsatisfactory.
This argument suggests that the first stage in creating education and training markets is to assure that both consumers and providers are "strong". These are both developmental processes, of course. They require that parents and students themselves become active decision-makers on their own behalf, a process that requires a full understanding of what. schooling can and cannot do for them and how the available alternatives serve their interests. The creation of choice in schooling might itself produce benefits over time, as more parents come to understand their responsibilities better. This is close to what Tooley (1997) argues when he notes that British choice mechanisms have allowed the active choosers among working-class parents to improve their children's education, clarifying that one reform alternative is to expand the number of working-class parents who can be active choosers. But at the outset, this educational process would have to be protected from the negative effects of passive choice, or parents would learn only that choice creates inequities.
The development of "strong" providers would also require, on the supply side, that educational institutions have more than profits and enrollment in mind, that they understand how to improve the learning of the different students they might serve, and that they monitor their own performance and use that information to improve their performance. This in turn requires the institutional development of "strong" institutions in advance of allowing market mechanisms to operate. This means, for example, developing competent magnet schools or Academies before opening them to the full force of competition or providing technical assistance to charter schools before requiring them to compete. This is precisely what Clayton (1994) describes as the advantage of her school in Cambridgeshire: by the time of adopting GM status, the school had been through "eleven years of increasing selfmanagement" under an early pilot project and so was ready to make the transition to the market. But for schools without such experience, the opening of markets comes as a rude shock.
If the U.S. is unwilling to undergo a lengthy developmental process on the way to greater choice, then, as the English experience shows, we ought to decide how we might better develop the combination of institutional supports and quasiomarket mechanisms that allow American schools freedom to innovate but at the same time require accountability in a public system. Various policy mechanisms--standard setting, finance, teacher training, public participation, public/private partnerships--provide different opportunities for development in education policy. But our caution is that, as Dewey suggests, simple dichotomies in these educational policy areas are unlikely to be fruitful. Rather, the best policy must focus on ways that improvements in educational outcomes can be realized by using combinations of approaches. Based on the English experience, it is inappropriate to throw the American public education system into upheaval with the use of purely market-based mechanisms, advertised as the quick-fix for enduring and complicated educational and societal complexities. Learning from the English after nearly 20 years, more moderate and more contextual approaches are more likely to be enduring solutions.
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